CHAPTER 3
COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

Section I. EVACUATION, RECEPTION AND PROCESSING

3-1. Evacuation to COMMZ

a. The TASCOM commander is responsible for the prompt evacuation of PW from the supported corps. This responsibility includes providing escort guards; the establishment and operation, as required, of transit facilities for overnight stops; and the establishment and operation of a PW camp designated for the reception and administrative processing of all PW evacuated to COMMZ from corps.

b. The evacuation of PW from corps to COMMZ is accomplished by military police escort guard companies (TOE 19-47). These companies may be attached to PW and processing reception camps, as needed.

c. The prompt and fully coordinated evacuation of PW from corps is facilitated by the prior dispatch of liaison officers and escort guards to the corps PW holding area to assure, within capabilities, a continuing availability of escort guards.

3-2. PW Camps

a. Designation and Location. Specific PW camps located in COMMZ are designated by the PW brigade commander for the centralized reception and the physical, medical, and administrative processing of PW evacuated from the combat zone. Dependent upon the size of the COMMZ and the number of evacuation terminals, one or more camps may be so designated. For centralization of activities and efficiency of operations, the very minimum number of reception and processing camps is established. The most advantageous locations for the establishment of such camps generally will be in the vicinity of major PW evacuation terminals. However, under circumstances whereby all PW camps are located in a common locale, a single PW reception and processing camp centrally located within the internment locale may be preferable to the establishment of a reception camp at each of two or more terminals. PW arriving intermittently or in lesser numbers at other than the major terminals are transported to the nearest reception and processing camp. Normally, one or two such camps will be required per corps supported.

b. Organization. A PW reception and processing camp differs from other PW camps in the following major respects:

(1) The attachment of a Military Police Prisoner of War Processing Company (TOE 19-237), or element thereof, to accomplish the administrative processing of each PW.

(2) The attachment of a Military Police Escort Guard Company (TOE 19-47) to evacuate PW from corps and to escort PW transfers to assigned camps on completion of processing.

(3) With the exception of a limited number of PW selected for retention, to assist in the operation and maintenance of the camp, all PW received are further transferred to other PW camps in COMMZ or are evacuated from COMMZ following completion of their processing.

(4) Team OB, TOE 8-620, may be attached to perform the medical processing actions, to include immunizations and medical examinations, assisting in disinfestations, and initiating PW medical records.

(5) Team LA, TOE 8-620, may be attached to train and supervise detained personnel who will perform delousing and disinfection procedures within the corps. The team chief will coordinate his activities with the camp medical section/surgeon and the camp commander.

3-3. Reception

a. General. To provide for the proper reception of PW, it must be anticipated that they may arrive at any hour of day or night, in varying extremes of weather conditions, and in differing states of health.

b. Reception Actions. As a minimum, reception actions will entail:

(1) The acceptance of PW at any time, day or night.
(2) The providing of emergency medical care for seriously sick or wounded PW.
(3) The providing of food, water, and shelter.
(4) The providing of separate facilities to maintain necessary segregation.

c. Segregation. For administrative and medical reasons, newly arrived PW are kept segregated from earlier arrivals who have been partially or completely processed. Further segregation by categories is maintained as possible pending completion of processing and further assignment to another camp.

3-4. Processing and Interrogation

a. Physical and Medical Processing. Dependent upon the time of arrival and number of PW received, the following PW processing is normally accomplished within 24 to 48 hours after arrival.
   (1) Haircut.
   (2) Lindane dusting.
   (3) Immunization (initial inoculations).
   (4) Physical inspection.
   (5) Issuance of clean clothing and toilet articles.
   (6) Issuance of mess equipment and blanket.

b. Administrative Processing.
   (1) The administrative processing of PW is accomplished by the Military Police Prisoner of War Processing Company (TOE 19–237) in accordance with the procedures prescribed in AR 633–50. This processing, for each PW, includes the preparation of a personnel record, a fingerprint card, an identity card (if required), and the assignment of an internment serial number. With the accomplishment of these records and the assignment of an internment serial number, the official status and identity of a captured enemy person as a PW are established.
   (2) The administrative processing of hospitalized PW should be accomplished as soon as their physical condition is such as to permit their identification by name, grade, serial number, and date of birth; and the accomplishment of their fingerprinting.

c. Selective intelligence interrogations will be conducted regardless of administrative processing procedures.

3-5. Classification

During the course of their administrative processing, PW are identified, classified, and segregated according to status, such as officers, noncommissioned officer, other enlisted personnel, retained personnel, or civilians; and by sex, nationality, and language. Those PW who refuse to reveal their military or civilian status are appropriately classified as unknowns to permit their segregation and later identification. Further categorization may be necessary for security purposes. This may entail identification of PW by political ideology, with a particular view toward classifying each PW as to one or the other of two or more violently opposed ideologies prior to assignment to another camp.

3-6. Assignment and Segregation

As soon as possible following their processing, PW are assigned to camps based upon assignment instructions received from the PW brigade. These instructions indicate the number and status of PW to be transferred to specific camps in the theater or other areas. Those PW of opposed ideologies are assigned to separate PW camps. Subject to the foregoing, other categories of PW (officer, enlisted; male, female) may be assigned for internment in the same PW camp provided their segregation by assignment to separate compounds or enclosures is maintained.

3-7. Accountability

Accountability for each PW on DA Form 2674-R (Internee Strength Report) is picked up by the commander of the PW reception camp as of the date of accomplishment of DA Form 4237, Prisoner of War Personnel Record, in accordance with the provisions of AR 633–50.

Section II. INTERNMENT FACILITIES

3-8. General

a. Types of Facilities. Internment facilities for PW are established as required in the COMMZ of a theater of operations or in CONUS. The PW internment facilities in the COMMZ are referred to either as PW camps or as PW branch camps. A PW camp is an installation of a semipermanent nature established for the internment and complete administration of PW. It is normally composed of enclosures consisting of one to eight 500 man enclosures. A PW branch camp is a subsidiary camp operated under the supervision and administration of the PW camp of which it is a branch. It is established in response to a definite
PW labor requirement. Each branch camp is located, organized, and equipped to facilitate accomplishment of the particular work need for which it is established.

b. Planning for Construction. Prior planning for PW camp construction is sufficiently projected into the future to provide for the timely selection and development of specific camp sites, the procurement of construction materials, and the accomplishment of actual construction. As an objective, construction should be planned and accomplished to maintain a standby capability for the acceptance of additional PW.

3-9. PW Internment Locale

a. Selection of Locale. Probably the most significant and critical aspect of the theater PW planning will relate to the selection of a locale or geographic area for the establishment of camps in which the PW population or a major portion thereof is to be interned. Failure to fully consider and correctly evaluate all pertinent factors may, as a minimum, impose an unnecessary increase in the logistical and personnel effort required to support the PW internment program. Under more serious circumstances the unwise selection of a PW internment locale may require the complete displacement of the entire PW population at a time when the extensive effort required to effect such a displacement can be least afforded.

b. Selection Criteria. Among the more significant of the factors to be considered in the selection of a PW internment local are:

1. Whether a PW population interned in the locale being considered will pose a potentially serious threat to the logistical support operations should the tactical situation become critical.
2. The threat and boldness, actual or potential, of guerrilla activity in the area.
3. The attitude of the local civilian population.
4. The attitude of the PW; i.e., friendly and cooperative or actively hostile and uncooperative.
5. Terrain considerations as related to camp construction and as they may help or hinder the probability of successful escapes.
6. Distance from source of logistical support and methods of transportation required and available for the transport of personnel, supplies, and equipment.

3-10. PW Camp Site
The selection of specific sites for the establishment of individual PW camps should reflect, as appropriate, considerations of the following:

a. The presence or absence of swamps, mosquitoes and malarial conditions, or other factors including water drainage that would affect human health.

b. Existence of an adequate and satisfactory source of water supply, to include a consideration of the amounts required for drinking, personal sanitation, and disposal of sewerage.

c. The local availability of an electric power supply. Restriction of the use of generators to a standby or emergency source of electricity is preferred.

d. Distances to work areas if employment is outside the camp.

e. The availability of suitable existing facilities to avoid unnecessary construction.

f. The local availability of construction materials.

g. Removal from immediate proximity to probable target areas.

3-11. PW Camp Construction

a. General. Construction specifications and material requirements are contained in TM 5-301-1, 5-301-2, and 5-301-3; TM 5-302-1 and 5-302-2; and TM 5-303. The specific type of construction which is necessary to satisfy minimum requirements will vary according to climate, anticipated permanency of the camp, number of camps to be established, the availability of labor and materials, and the conditions under which the forces of the detaining power are billeted in the same area. Local facilities may be used if practicable to reduce the requirements for engineer construction material and personnel. Whenever possible, necessary modifications or construction should be accomplished by PW and local sources of material used to the maximum extent possible. Tents may be, at least in the initial stages of camp activation, the most practicable means for housing PW.

b. Minimum Construction Requirements. The following are minimum construction standards to satisfy security requirements for PW camps.

1. A double barbed wire fence around the perimeter of each of the one or more enclosures composing the PW camp.
   a. Top guards with several strands of barbed wire at the top of the outside perimeter fence.
   b. A 12-foot clear zone, free of any vege-
(2) Guard towers located on the perimeter of each enclosure and constructed to conform with the following requirements:

(a) Sufficiently high to permit unobstructed observation.

(b) Placed immediately outside the wall or, in the case of a double fence, in such a manner as to permit an unobstructed view of the lane between fences.

(c) Low enough to provide adequate field of fire.

(d) Spaced to secure optimum observation. During adverse weather conditions, it may be necessary to augment security by placing fixed guard posts between towers on the outside of the fence.

(e) Platforms sufficiently wide to mount crew-served automatic weapons.

(f) Equipped with retractable ladders.

(3) Adequate lighting facilities throughout the camp and especially around the perimeter of each enclosure to meet the following requirements:

(a) Sufficient lighting on fences or walls at night to permit the ready detection of PW attempting to escape.

(b) Sufficient lighting at inner strategic points to permit expeditious handling of any sudden contingencies which may arise.

(c) Provisions for secondary emergency lighting.

(d) Protection for light bulbs and reflectors against breakage by a wire mesh covering, where necessary.

(e) Installation of lights on fences or walls focused or shaded in such a manner as not to interfere with the vision of tower guards.

(4) Patrol roads constructed adjacent to the outside of the perimeter wall or fence for vehicular or foot patrols.

(5) Communications, preferably by telephone, established between the towers and main camp headquarters. In the event of operational interruptions or difficulties, alternate means of communications, such as radio, visual or sound signals should be provided as backup to primary means.

(6) When practicable, enclosures should be sufficiently separated from each other to preclude PW communication between them. In the selection of enclosure sites, full advantage should be taken of existing irregular terrain features as obstacles to such communications. On level terrain, distances of up to a mile may be required between enclosures. For efficiency of operations and consistent with security considerations, distances between enclosures should not be unnecessarily extended.

c. Enclosure Layout and Facilities.

(1) Layout. A PW camp may consist of one or more enclosures. The type site layout for a 4000-man PW enclosure is shown in figures 3-1 and 3-1-continued.

(2) Facilities.

(a) A recreation area for the use of the PW from each compound on a scheduled basis is provided for in each enclosure.

(b) Common services and facilities provided for in the administration area (fig 3-1—cont.) include—

1. An enclosure command post and administrative office.

2. A sally port for the search of vehicles and personnel entering or leaving the enclosure.

3. A dispensary and infirmary for the treatment of minor illnesses and injuries.

4. A building for the conduct of religious services.

5. A building for the conduct of an educational program and other approved intellectual activities.

6. A supply building for the limited storage and issuance of items of clothing and selected expendable supplies.

7. A building or suitable office space/interrogation booths, for the exclusive use of interrogators.

d. Compound Layout and Facilities.

(1) Layout. Each standard type 4000-man PW enclosure consists of eight 500-man PW compounds. The site layout for a 500-man PW compound is shown in figure 3-1—continued.

(2) Facilities. Compound facilities (fig 3-1—cont.) include:

(a) A compound command post and administrative building.

(b) Barracks.

(c) Dining or mess facility.

(d) Bathing and washing facilities.

(e) Latrine facilities.

3-12. PW Branch Camps

a. The PW branch camps are organized under TOE 19–550. The organization of each branch camp is tailored according to the size of the camp by the selection of the appropriate type administrative team and the required number of dis-
DETAILS OF COMPOUND AND ADMINISTRATIVE AREA
4000-MAN PW/C1 ENCLOSURE 2,050'-0" x 1,050'-0"
500-MAN COMPOUNDS 280'-0" x 400'-0"

LEGEND *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>ITEM AND SIZE</th>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>ITEM AND SIZE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>BARRACKS 20'-100'</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>DISPENSARY &amp; INFIRMARY 20'-100'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>MESS KITCHEN 20'-40'</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>COMMAND POST &amp; ADMINISTRATION 20'-100'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>BATH HOUSE 20'-50'</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>GUARD TOWER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>LATRINE 10'-50'</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>GUARD TOWER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>RELIGIOUS &amp; EDUCATIONAL 20'-100'</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>WATER TOWER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SUPPLY 20' - 100'</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>FENCE TYPE &quot;Y&quot; INTERIOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>DISPENSARY &amp; INFIRMARY 20' - 00'</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>FENCE TYPE &quot;X&quot; EXTERIOR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* NOTE: LEGEND NUMBERS REFER TO THE OVERALL ENCLOSURE AS WELL AS TO THE DETAILS OF COMPOUND AND ADMINISTRATIVE AREA.

(Detail).

Figure 3–1—Continued.
mounted military police working dog teams and/or security guard teams. Mess personnel and equipment for the operation of a PW mess are provided for as authorized in TOE 29–500, except that qualified PW personnel should be substituted for US Army personnel.

Note. Dogs will be employed only to track and capture escaped PW.

b. The PW branch camps are established in response to specific requirements for PW labor at areas or locations removed beyond a reasonable daily travel distance from the nearest PW camp. They are located near or within the immediate vicinity of the supply or other facility being supported. They are operated on an austere basis utilizing existing facilities when available; otherwise, tent shelter is provided to permit ready dismantlement and displacement to a new work location. Requirements for administrative and security personnel will be minimal. Assigned PW must be skilled in the work to be performed and should have been screened and selected on the basis of their pro-United States sympathies and cooperative attitudes.

c. Each PW branch camp is operated under the administrative supervision of a parent PW camp. The parent PW camp—

(1) Exercises administrative control over and provides administrative support to each of its branch camps.

(2) Provides or arranges for veterinary service, refresher training, and replacements for military police working dogs.

d. The using installation of facility commander—

(1) Provides guards and technical supervisors for PW work details.

(2) Provides required logistical support.

(3) Provides medical dispensary service and chaplain assistance.

(4) Establishes and maintains an “on-call” security alert force to provide assistance to the PW branch camp commander if required.

(5) Is responsible for the control and security of PW while they are on work details.

(6) Is responsible for the procurement of materials in the construction and maintenance of the branch camp as specified by the commander of the parent PW camp.

e. The PW branch camp commander—

(1) Is responsible for PW administration and, while within the branch camp, for their security and control.

(2) Provides work details on a timely basis.

(3) Supervises PW employment to assure compliance with the provisions of AR 633–50.

f. Branch camp security is provided for by the assignment of the required number of security guard personnel. During hours of daylight, one guard should normally be stationed on an as required basis in a strategically located and sufficiently elevated tower.

Section III. ADMINISTRATION

3-13. Introduction

a. Regulations and other guidance relative to the administration, employment, and compensation of PW are prescribed in detail in AR 633-50, Prisoners of War—Administration, Employment, and Compensation; AR 37–36, Pay, Allowances, and Deposit of Personal Funds—Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees; JCS Publication 3. and FM 27–10. It is the responsibility of the PW camp commander to assure that all members of his staff and command are thoroughly familiar with applicable international law and the administrative procedures prescribed therein.

b. The initial administrative processing of PW is accomplished at a designated PW reception and processing camp (s) prior to their assignment to a permanent PW camp.

c. Upon completion of this administrative processing, PW strength accountability and individual data reporting will be accomplished by means of a strength report (DA Form 2674–R) prepared and transmitted daily by each PW camp to the Branch United States Prisoner of War Information Center located in the theater.

d. The guidance contained herein is generally applicable to all PW camps whether located in COMMZ, CONUS, or elsewhere.

3-14. Administrative Policies

a. General. The following general principles are applicable to the administration of PW camps:

(1) Prisoners of war are utilized for the internal administration and operation of PW camps as much as possible.

(2) Maximum use is made of captured enemy supplies and equipment.
of unsupported statements of, or identity papers provided by, the PW. Confirmation of the veracity of individual PW or the authenticity of identification documents in their possession will, in most instances, be virtually impossible prior to their further transfer to a PW camp. The true identity of PW agitators, of enemy “plants,” or of PW leaders will eventually be evidenced by their activities and they may then be reclassified according to their true identity or ideology. Additionally, it may be expected that a number of PW will, in good faith, during the course of their internment revert or be converted from one ideology to another.

3-17. PW Name Identification Band

a. The PW identification band [fig 3-2] permits the rapid and reliable identification of individual PW. A PW can forcibly remove the band but, in so doing, will destroy the band for further wearing by himself or by another PW without ready detection. While any single PW or group of PW cannot be prevented from removing or destroying the band, it may be expected that many of the PW will accept the use of the band for identification purposes. Such ready identification facilitates PW camp administration and operation since the ability to individually identify PW is an inherent requirement throughout such activities.

b. Following assignment of an internment serial number, the ISN and last name of the PW are recorded on the identification band which is then attached to the left wrist of the PW. Varied colored bands are provided to permit identification by categories, such as retained personnel, by nationality, or any of a number of other categories in which ready group identification will facilitate administration.

c. Although the identification band is accorded a life expectancy of 6 months, the actual wear-out period may be expected to vary dependent largely upon the type of work being performed by the PW. When serious deterioration is noted or the ISN and name are not readily visible, the old band should be immediately replaced with a new one.

d. The requirements for the identification of PW as individuals are many and varied. Among the more common uses envisioned, however, are:

(1) Periodic verification of compound PW rosters against the actual compound population.

(2) Identification of members of work details.

f. Although primarily intended for use by the military police PW processing company and at the PW camps, the use of the band for other purposes is not precluded; i.e., the temporary identification of selected captives in the combat zone.

3-18. Standing Orders

To provide for uniform and orderly camp administration, it is necessary that procedures, rules, and instructions to be observed by PW be published and posted where they may be read and referred to by them. Standing orders should generally include rules and procedures governing the following activities and such other matters as may be deemed appropriate.

a. Daily formations and routines to include—
   (1) Reveille.
   (2) Morning roll call.
   (3) Readiness of quarters for inspection.
   (4) Sick call.
   (5) Mess call.
   (6) Evening roll call.
   (7) Blackout.
   (8) Lights out.

b. Daily fatigue details.

c. Fire drills.

d. Air raid drills.

e. Announcement of hours for religious services, recreational activities, and operation of camp facilities.

f. Emergency sick call procedures.

3-19. Accountability

a. Internee Strength Report. Detailed procedures governing the preparation and dispatch of daily internee strength reports by each PW interment facility are set forth in AR 633–50.

b. Feeder Reports. The preparation of complete, accurate and timely internee strength reports may be facilitated by the submission of "feeder" reports from each PW enclosure headquarters to the PW camp headquarters. Such reports should require submission of only that information and data which are not otherwise readily available in the PW camp headquarters. Similarly, a requirement for "feeder" reports from each compound may be found feasible by the enclosure commander.
3-20. Records and Reports

Procedures governing the preparation, maintenance, and disposition of records and reports, other than the internee strength report, are also set forth in AR 633–50. Additional local records or reports may be prescribed by appropriate commanders as necessary for the effective control, supervision, and disposition of enemy PW. Such reports may be required on either a periodic or “as required” basis, and may cover the administrative, operational, logistical, intelligence, and personnel situations. Normal command and staff records and reports, such as staff section journals, duty officer logs, worksheets, and situation maps, may be required.

3-21. Automatic Data Processing System (ADPS)

PW application, ADPS may be used to process personnel data on PW and to aid in general accountability management of those captured or detained. Among its principal advantages are a substantial savings in manpower required for reporting and recordkeeping, speed in compilation of data so that records are always current, accuracy of reporting, and elimination of worn and partially obliterated PW records and thereby increasing the longevity of records. In addition, it provides information about PW with special qualifications almost instantly, thus the most efficient utilization of PW can be accomplished. See appendix C for additional details on interim PW data processing procedures.

Section IV. DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL

3-22. General

a. All PW are treated fairly but firmly at all times. Orders should be given decisively and in a language which the PW understand. It is necessary to insure that all orders are reasonable, capable of being obeyed, and are given in a manner and language which the PW can clearly understand. A refusal or failure by a PW to obey an order should be promptly reported and appropriate disciplinary action taken.

b. Rules, regulations, instructions, and announcements to be observed and obeyed by PW are published and posted in each compound. Compliance with the provisions of such directives is fully and firmly enforced.

c. Camp commanders take positive action to establish those daily or periodic routines which are conducive to good PW discipline and control to include:

1. The conduct of inspections of PW quarters, facilities and activities on a daily or other regularly scheduled basis.
2. The holding of roll call formations not less than twice daily.
3. The periodic examination of PW wrist identification bands to detect efforts to switch identities.

3-23. Standing Orders

The following rules are suggested for inclusion in posted regulations or orders governing the conduct and discipline of PW:

a. All PW will comply with the rules and orders deemed necessary for their safety, good order, and discipline.

b. All PW are subject to the orders of US Army personnel placed over them. All such orders will be obeyed immediately.

c. Deliberate disobedience, coupled with resistance, or conduct of a mutinous or riotous kind will, if necessary, be dealt with by force.

d. Any PW guilty of disobedience to rules or orders or any act, conduct, disorder, or neglect prejudicial to good order and discipline among PW is subject to disciplinary or judicial punishment.

e. No PW will receive disciplinary or judicial punishment until he has been informed of the offense(s) of which he has been accused and given an opportunity to explain his conduct and to defend himself. If a PW has committed an offense for which judicial punishment may arise, investigation of this offense will be coordinated with the SJA prior to being undertaken to insure it is conducted in accordance with the GPW. He may call witnesses and, if necessary, will be provided with the services of a qualified interpreter.

f. Disciplinary punishment may include—

1. Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the GPW.
2. A fine not to exceed one-half of the advance pay and working pay that the PW would otherwise receive during a period of not more than 30 days.
3. Fatigue duties not exceeding two hours
daily for PW privates. Noncommissioned officers may be required to perform supervisory duties only.

g. A restricted diet in conjunction with disciplinary segregation may be imposed upon a PW in confinement.

h. The establishment of courts and the administration of punishment by PW are prohibited.

i. All PW are forbidden to have in their possession knives, sticks, pieces of iron or other articles which could be used as weapons.

j. No drilling or marching in military formation is allowed for any purpose except as authorized and directed by the PW camp commander.

k. Meetings and propaganda for political purposes are prohibited. The wearing or displaying of national political emblems is prohibited.

l. Gambling is prohibited.

m. The PW are not allowed to possess or consume intoxicating beverages.

Section V.

3-25. General
All PW are accorded humane treatment and are to be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity. Taking into consideration their rank, sex, and privileged treatment which may be accorded by reason of their state of health, age, or professional qualification, all PW are treated alike.

3-26. Officers
Privileges and considerations accorded each officer PW include—

a. Quarters and facilities commensurate with their grade.

b. They may not be compelled to work.

c. Enlisted orderlies assigned at the ratio of one orderly for each general officer and one orderly for each twelve officers of a lower grade.

3-27. Retained Personnel
Privileges and considerations extended to retained personnel by reason of their profession include—

a. Additional correspondence privileges for chaplains and for the senior retained medical officer over and above that afforded officer PW.

b. The granting of all facilities necessary to provide PW with medical care, spiritual assistance, and welfare services.

c. The authority and means of transportation for periodic visits to PW branch camps and to hospitals outside the PW camp to carry out their medical, spiritual or welfare duties.

d. The restriction of their work assignment to only those medical or religious duties which they are qualified to perform.

e. The assignment to quarters, when practicable, separate from those of PW.

Section VI. CORRESPONDENCE

3-28. Correspondence Quotas

a. Authorized quotas for the mailing of letters and cards by PW are as follows:

   (1) Five letters and five post cards per month for each general officer.

   (2) Three letters and four post cards per month for each officer below the grade of general officer.

   (3) Two letters and four post cards per month for each enlisted PW.
b. In addition to his authorized correspondence quota, each PW is permitted within one week after arrival at a PW camp for processing to dispatch a capture card to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Upon any subsequent transfer from one camp to another, he may send a notification of address card to his next-of-kin.

3-29. Correspondence Forms
The requisitioning and supplying of forms for PW correspondence is a responsibility of the PW camp commander. If PW are prevented from writing their monthly quotas of letters and cards because of a lack of stationery forms, they are allowed to make up their quotas when forms become available.

3-30. Telegrams and Telephone Calls
The PW are permitted to receive and, under certain circumstances, dispatch telegrams. They may not make telephone calls.

3-31. Parcels
The PW may receive but may not dispatch parcels. All parcels, including contents, container, and wrapping are carefully examined for unauthorized items and concealed or coded messages.

3-32. Procedures
Regulatory procedures governing the receipt and dispatch of PW correspondence are set forth in AR 633-50.

Section VII. SANITATION AND MEDICAL CARE

3-33. Sanitation
Measures are taken to insure the cleanliness of camps and to prevent epidemics. Adequate space is allocated to prevent overcrowding within housing units; sufficient latrines, showers, and lavatories are provided and are kept sanitary; the rules of good mess sanitation are observed; waste is disposed of in accordance with the facilities available, but in such a manner as to insure the protection of health. Sufficient water is made available for drinking, bathing, laundry, and culinary purposes. The PW are furnished necessary materials, such as soap, razor blades, detergents, and brushes to insure personal cleanliness and a sanitary environment.

3-34. Medical Care
Medical inspections are made and the weight of each PW is recorded at least once a month. Provisions are made for the isolation of communicable cases, for disinfection, and for inoculations. Retained medical personnel and PW with medical training are used to the fullest extent in caring for their own sick and wounded. If adequate facilities are not available in PW hospitals, PW are admitted to military or civilian medical installations where the required treatment can be obtained.

Section VIII. TRANSFERS

3-35. General
The transfer of PW is effected insofar as possible under conditions comparable to those for members of US Armed Forces. Security measures appropriate to the type of PW being transferred, the mode of transportation used, and other pertinent conditions are prescribed by the major commanders concerned.

3-36. Administrative Processing
The commander of the PW camp effecting a PW transfer is responsible for accomplishment of the following administrative actions:

a. Informing each PW of his new postal address in time to permit him to notify his next-of-kin and the Central Prisoner of War Information Agency.

b. Verifying the accuracy and completeness of personnel records of each PW and providing the record, in a sealed envelope, to the escort guard accompanying the movement.

c. Verifying that each PW has in his possession his authorized clothing and equipment.

d. Preparing impounded personal effects and property of PW for forwarding with escort guard or by separate shipment, as appropriate.

e. Instructing escort guards with respect to their duties and responsibilities including procedures to be followed in the event of an escape, death, or other emergency.

f. Providing or making arrangements for rations, transportation, and the transmission of appropriate notifications in accordance with prescribed procedures.
c. Chaplains and PW who have been serving as clergymen are permitted to transfer at government expense an additional 110 pounds in order to take with them their communion sets, theological books, and other religious material.

3-38. Regulatory Procedures
Prescribed procedures governing PW transfers are set forth in AR 633–50.

Section IX. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

3-39. General
Prescribed standards of treatment and care to be accorded PW, as further discussed below, establish a need for supplies and equipment which is considerable, both in terms of the quantity and of the variety of the items required. To assist the commander in the discharge of this responsibility, suggested allowances and authorizations for certain items of supplies and equipment for PW and PW camps are set forth at Appendix D. Appendix D is a guide only and may be modified by commanders as deemed appropriate. These items of supply and equipment are easily exploited by PW if not properly secured and accounted for (FM 19-30).

3-40. Subsistence

a. The basic daily food ration for PW must be sufficient in quantity, quality, and variety to keep them in good health and to prevent loss of weight or nutritional deficiencies. The habitual diet of the various national groups must be considered. Working PW must be supplied with additional rations, as necessary, for the labor on which they are employed.

b. Ration scales which take into consideration national diets are contained in FM 101–10–1. Components of these ration scales are based on the standard B ration. Where perishable supplies are available, plans should be made to substitute perishable items of food at the earliest possible time.

c. Prior to issue, articles of the US Army uniform are altered by dying to another color and/or stenciling with the letters “PW.” Official buttons are replaced by buttons without distinctive markings.

d. Except for hats and other accessories, the marking of each item of PW clothing which may be worn as an outer garment is required (AR 633–50). Figure 3–3 illustrates the prescribed marking for such clothing. At the discretion of the camp commander, internment serial numbers or other identification marks may be written or stamped on the inside of all clothing. The clothing for retained personnel is marked in the same manner as clothing for PW, except that the letters “RP” are substituted for the letters “PW.”

3-42. Handtools
Maximum utilization of PW labor for camp construction and maintenance activities is encouraged. The early availability of the required handtools and implements will permit the gainful employment of numbers of PW on a variety of necessary and useful camp projects. Suggested allowances are set forth at Appendix D.

3-43. Housekeeping Equipment
The PW camp requirements for housekeeping equipment are limited. Under field conditions, certain items such as water bags for drinking water and laundry facilities are essential.
3-44. Janitorial and Cleaning Supplies
Janitorial and cleaning supply requirements will vary considerably as to the types and quantities of items needed, dependent upon the local environment and the type of housing and messing facilities provided. Supply Bulletin 700–50, Expendable Items (Except Medical, Class V, Repair Parts and Heraldic Items), contains an extensive listing of such supplies and should be used as a guide for developing individual PW camp allowances for janitorial and cleaning supplies.

3-45. Mess Equipment
Requirements for PW camp kitchen mess will vary dependent upon national diets and customs. For the operation of an occidental field types mess kitchen, the standard army field range and accessory equipment, as suggested at appendix D, will be generally adequate. For the operation of an oriental type mess, the field range together with certain of the accessory equipment and an additional allowance of pots will suffice. When deemed appropriate by the responsible commander, authorization may be granted for the local procurement of oriental type cooking equipment to be used in lieu of standard mess equipment.

3-46. Chapel Facilities
The providing of chapel facilities and materials is required for the conduct of religious services in PW camps. Certain of the chapel fixtures can be readily constructed by PW from locally available materials. Certain other items must be obtained through procurement channels. In addition to the items suggested at Appendix D, reference should be made to SB 700–50.

3-47. Recreational Equipment
The provision of recreational equipment serves to provide a necessary outlet for PW energies and a break in the daily routine of extended internment. Those sports and activities involving physical activity promote the general health of the participants. In addition to the items suggested at Appendix D, consideration should be given to the procurement of indigenous types games and equipment.

3-48. Agricultural Supplies
Agricultural and gardening projects are popular PW camp activities and are particularly desirable projects in that they provide gainful employment for large numbers of PW. The food products raised provide a valuable supplement to the PW diet at minimal expense. The types and quantities of agricultural supplies required, to include seeds, fertilizers, and implements, will vary so widely as to generally preclude the establishment of any uniform allowance factors. The importance of developing an active agricultural program and of providing in advance, for the timely procurement of required supplies should not be overlooked by the commanders concerned.

Section X. SOCIAL PRIVILEGES

3-49. General
As a general policy the conduct of an active, intellectual, educational, and recreational program for PW is to be encouraged and supported. Adequate facilities, instructional material and recreational equipment should be provided for such activities. The scope of such a program in camps in which uncooperative PW with openly antagonistic attitudes are interned will of necessity be limited.
3-50. Education

a. The education program is developed in accordance with announced Department of the Army policy guidance. Within the framework of this guidance and implementing directives issued by other responsible headquarters, a separate education program is developed for each PW camp. Each such program must be developed to reflect the individual attitudes and political orientations of the PW in the particular camp. Among those factors and considerations which will exert a determining influence on the scope and nature of the education program to be presented are:

(1) The several educational levels represented by the PW population.

(2) Receptive, negative, or hostile PW attitudes.

(3) Requirements for PW for essential and necessary labor will normally take precedence over the conduct of an educational activity.

(4) The availability of qualified instructors, to include PW, indigenous personnel, and/or US Army military and civilian personnel. Security considerations may restrict or effectively prohibit the use of PW or indigenous personnel.

b. In addition to academic education, vocational training should be considered as an integral part of the education program. Such training should have the immediate objective of developing those skills which may be gainfully employed during internment and a longer range goal of enabling PW to learn trades in which they may engage upon return to civilian life.

3-51. Religion

a. The PW are allowed freedom of worship including attendance at services of their respective faith held within the PW camp. The PW and US personnel will not attend worship services together.

b. Retained chaplains and other PW clergymen are permitted to devote their full time to ministering to PW of their faith. In accordance with approved procedures, the camp commander may permit entry into the camp and conduct of services by other ordained clergymen or theological students.

3-52. Visits

Visits by accredited representatives of the Protecting Powers and the International Committee of the Red Cross and by representatives of approved religious organizations, relief societies and other organizations assisting PW are permitted in accordance with policies and procedures prescribed by Department of the Army.

3-53. Recreation

The active participation by PW in recreational activities will, in addition to promoting their general health and welfare, serve to alleviate the tensions and boredom generally attendant upon extended internment. In addition to athletic contests, group entertainment may be provided in the form of concerts, plays, recorded music, and the showing of selected motion pictures.

Section XI. EMPLOYMENT

3-54. General

a. The PW constitute a significant labor force for the performance of both skilled and unskilled types of work. The increased range of tactical weapons, the frequent displacement of units and facilities, and heavy logistical support implications virtually negate the utilization of PW in the corps area. In the forward area of a COMMZ, PW logistical support requirements are also an inhibiting factor as is the need for additional security personnel, particularly if guerrilla activity is prevalent. Significant PW utilization in this area will probably be of an absolute minimal nature to perform vitally essential work for which no other manpower source is available. Generally, conditions favoring the greatest utilization of PW will exist in the supply complex in the rear area of a COMMZ. It is in this area that the most stable and favorable environment for PW utilization will exist.

b. The serious threat of nuclear or CBR warfare will virtually eliminate serious consideration am PW utilization except in the very rear areas of the COMMZ. The heavy individual protective clothing and equipment requirements in addition to other support considerations would serve to nullify the real value of any work performed. During and for some time after actual and large scale nuclear or CBR operations, the primary and probably exclusive concern of even the most cooperative PW will be one of survival.

c. To the maximum extent possible, PW are utilized for all work necessary for the administration, management, construction, and maintenance of PW camps and facilities.
3-55. Liability to Perform Labor

a. Officer PW may not be required to work but may volunteer to do so.

b. Noncommissioned officer PW may be compelled to do supervisory work only. They may volunteer to perform manual labor.

c. All other enlisted PW may be required to do any and all work consistent with the guidance contained herein and the provisions of AR 633–50.

d. All PW must be physically fit to perform the work to which they are assigned.

3-56. Labor Restrictions on Prisoners of War

The extent to which PW labor may be most fully utilized will be conditioned by a number of considerations. Several of the more significant considerations attendant upon utilization are set forth below.

a. A PW may volunteer but may not be compelled to transport or handle stores or to engage in public works and building operations which have a military character or purpose.

b. A PW may not be employed on labor considered to be injurious to his health or dangerous because of the inherent nature of the work, the particular conditions under which it is performed, the individual’s physical unfitness, or because of the lack of technical skill. Article 52, GPW, provides guidance on PW who volunteer for these tasks.

c. A PW may not be assigned to labor that would be looked upon as humiliating or degrading for a member of the United States Armed Forces. This prohibition has no effect on the performance of unpleasant but necessary tasks connected with the administration and maintenance of the internment camp.

d. A PW may not be retained or employed in an area where he may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone.

3-57. Effective Utilization

Although PW constitutes a large potential source of manpower for the theater commander, the extent to which this potential may be economically utilized will be conditioned by a number of factors. Several of the more significant considerations attendant upon PW utilization in a theater of operations are set forth below.

a. Labor Essentiality. Evaluation by the commander must not fail to relate the essentiality of the work to be performed to the personnel and logistical effort required to provide the PW labor. Generally, a significant increase in this effort for the sole purpose of providing PW labor assumes an absence of qualified indigenous labor and a determination by the commander that military personnel are not available or that their employment would be less advantageous.

b. Logistical Support. The practical utilization of PW is governed, in part, by the logistical effort required to make them available for the labor to be performed. Significant factors include:

1. New construction requirements.
2. Anticipated duration of work requirement.
3. Number of PW or civilian internees required.
4. Distance PW supplies and equipment must be transported.
5. Distance to hospital facilities.

c. Personnel Requirements. Factors influencing requirements for security and work supervisory personnel include:

1. Attitude of indigenous population, friendly or hostile.
2. Prevalence and aggressiveness of guerrilla activity.
3. Terrain (wooded, hilly, etc.) and local (populated, undeveloped) considerations.
4. The type of work to be performed and the size, number, and dispersion of the individual work details provided by the branch camp.

3-58. Camp Commander’s Responsibility

When PW utilization is a significant consideration, it is the responsibility of the camp commander to so organize and administer the PW camp as to permit the proper and ready employment of each PW. Measures which, subject to security considerations, may be of assistance in this regard include:

a. Establishment and maintenance of a current occupational skill record for each PW to include new skills for which a PW may become qualified through on-the-job training, vocational training or academic study.

b. Assignment of individual PW to a work detail or job on a regular or permanent basis insofar as possible. This is particularly desirable when occupational skills or knowledge of the work procedures are involved.
c. Assignment of PW to barracks, compounds, or enclosures so as to facilitate their dispatch on work details.

Section XII.

3-59. General

a. Security for a PW camp is concerned with those measures by which the camp commander may most effectively and with the minimum use of force exercise the fullest control over all PW actions and activities. The physical construction of the camp and the presence of guard personnel constitute the most obvious means of providing security. Few aspects of PW camp operations are devoid of security implications. Maintenance of a high state of discipline, a system of routines, and required standards of behavior are all measures which enhance effective PW security and control.

b. It may be expected that many PW will either actively cooperate with US PW camp authorities or will assume a passive and compliant role. This cooperative or compliant PW faction will be composed, in part, of PW with ideologies favorable to the US; others, through resignation or apathy, will simply adapt themselves to the conditions of their internment.

c. Experience has taught that numbers of PW may engage in a campaign of embarrassing and harassing the US at every opportunity in order to force the employment of the maximum number of troops for other than combat missions and to create news of propaganda value to the enemy. The leaders of this uncooperative PW faction may attempt to insure a united effort and blind obedience by all of its members. They will not be content with merely planning and attempting to escape or employing normal nuisance harassment tactics. These leaders will attempt to organize and regiment PW so completely that they will follow their leaders’ dictates regardless of consequences. The leaders will assign duties and missions to individuals so they will not stop resisting while they are interned. Any relaxation of security will be immediately detected and fully exploited.

d. Firm control must be maintained over PW. Policies, procedures, techniques, and tactics must be adapted to achieve this objective. The security measures set forth in this section are intended to assist camp commanders in this undertaking.

3-60. Specific Adverse Actions

Dissident actions by the same PW may vary from acts of harassment to acts of violence. The enemy forces may take certain actions to further support PW resistance activities. Such actions may include:

a. Prisoner of War.
   (1) Refusal to eat.
   (2) Refusal to work or to attend formations or working in a perfunctory manner.
   (3) Malingering.
   (4) Sabotage of equipment and facilities.
   (5) Assault upon other PW or custodial personnel.
   (6) Capture of hostages to secure concessions.
   (7) Individual escapes or mass breakouts.
   (8) Intimidation of other PW.
   (9) Fabrication of weapons or other illegal items.
   (10) Printing and dissemination of propaganda material.
   (11) Creating embarrassing situations or making false accusations to influence international inspection teams or members of the Protecting Powers.
   (12) Instigation of disturbances or riots to place the camp authorities in an unfavorable position in order to gain concessions and to influence custodial policies.

b. Enemy Forces.
   (1) Attempts to establish communications with prisoners by means of agents, smuggled radios, or foreign language newspapers.
   (2) The enemy may order certain members of its armed forces to submit to capture. These individuals usually will have specific duties to carry out, such as agitators, in the internment camp.
   (3) Attempts to liberate PW through direct military action by regular or irregular forces.

3-61. Security Planning

a. Effective PW camp security is contingent upon careful and intelligent planning. Such planning must be based on a careful evaluation by the camp commander and his staff of the security resources available to them and of the capabilities of the PW to offer effective resistance to control.
measures. Planning must be continuous to reflect current intelligence information relating to PW plans for uprisings, outbreaks, or escapes. Planning must be complete and inclusive to assure an immediate responsive capability for meeting any threat, from within or without, to the security of the camp.

b. Detailed planning guidance is contained in FM 101-5. Close observance and application of the planning principles, procedures, and techniques set forth therein will provide the greatest assurance of adequate and timely security planning.

3-62. Intelligence

a. The first objective of the PW camp intelligence system is the procurement of information whereby individual PW may be accurately classified as cooperative or uncooperative. Successful accomplishment of this objective will greatly minimize the overall security and control problem by permitting the early segregation of the "hard-core" uncooperative PW in maximum security type PW camps.

b. Accurate and timely intelligence relative to PW attitudes and activities enables the camp commander and his staff to forecast the outbreak of disturbances and other clandestine activities. It also aids in determining measures necessary to maintain uncontested control as well as to adjust to significant trends. This information, properly evaluated, is an important means of countering resistance movements and minimizing the use of force. If the leaders, the plans, and the methods of dissident elements are known, the likelihood of their being able to mount major demonstrations or to strike serious blows is sharply reduced. To secure this information, a camp commander must have an efficient intelligence system responsive to his needs.

c. Security and administrative personnel in their day-to-day contact with PW are capable of acquiring important information through observation and insight even though they are not intelligence specialists. All camp personnel should be trained to detect and report significant information.

d. In compounds where cooperative PW are interned, a special intelligence organization will not be needed, provided ordinary sources of information are tapped continually and assessed sensitively. Such sources include regular administrative communications, observations, reports of military administrative and security personnel, criminal investigation data, disciplinary reports, and statements of grievance.

3-63. Intelligence Requirements

a. Intelligence requirements consist of specific information required by the commander to insure continued control of PW and those items of information requested by higher headquarters and other agencies.

b. The intelligence officer is responsible for coordinating PW camp intelligence requirements in order to maintain a constant flow of useful intelligence information for the commander’s use. In coordination with higher headquarters and other interested agencies, he prepares a listing of specific elements of information required by them.

3-64. Essential Elements of Information

a. The identity of PW agitators, leaders, and their followers.

b. The existence of clandestine PW organizations, to include organization, strength, objectives, and identity of members.

c. The existence of an underground communications system between PW compounds, enclosures, and camps or with indigenous civilian personnel.

d. Overt attempts by PW or by local indigenous personnel to communicate with each other.

e. Suspicious activities of indigenous personnel, such as photography or sketching in the vicinity of the PW camp.

f. Existence of fabricated weapons, stores of food, and supplies of clothing in the compound.

g. Plans by PW to conduct demonstrations to include date and time; numbers of PW involved by compounds; nature of planned demonstration as passive resistance, harassing acts, or acts involving violence; and objectives to include propaganda, a weakening or testing of camp authority and security, establishing PW control in individual compounds or enclosures, mass escapes or outbreaks, etc.

3-65. Obtaining Intelligence Information

The mechanics of collecting information and processing it into useful intelligence at PW camps is based on the principles of military intelligence. Methods of obtaining intelligence information relative to clandestine PW activities include—

a. The providing of opportunities for PW to volunteer information of intelligence value and
the offering of protection from reprisal by removal or transfer to safe-facilities.

b. Periodic and unannounced compound searches and patrols.

c. Individual search of all PW on departure from and return to the camp enclosure.

d. Training of security personnel in the techniques and importance of observing, recognizing, and reporting information which may be of intelligence value, such as:

(1) Any unusual activities, especially before holidays or celebrations.

(2) Messages being passed at distribution points for food and supplies, the enclosure dispensary, and hospitals.

(3) Messages being passed between groups of PW on labor details.

(4) Messages being passed to or from local civilians while PW are on labor details.

(5) Messages being signaled from one compound to another.

e. The development of a reliable PW intelligence net extending to each PW compound. The reliability of such PW informants may be verified by use of the polygraph. Such use of the polygraph is solely for testing the reliability of an informant and not for judicial or disciplinary punishment purposes. The establishment of such an informant system is subject to local consideration of the special hazards that may be involved. Every precaution must be taken to provide for the safety of the individual PW informants.

3-66. Security Precautions

The following are among the more common places and means by which PW from different compounds, enclosures, and camps may communicate with each other.

a. Camp Dispensary and Food Distribution Points. Messages may be secreted where they can be found by PW from other compounds and enclosures. Alert observations and the conduct of periodic searches will minimize the value of these facilities for the exchange of PW communications.

b. PW Hospitals. Precautions which may be taken to minimize the value of the hospital to PW for communications purposes include the careful examination of each PW admitted to assure that hospitalization is required, not informing PW of their discharge from the hospital until the last possible moment, and conducting a complete search of each PW and his personal effects upon admission and discharge from the hospital.

c. Work Details. If permitted to pass or work in close proximity to each other, the exchange of information between work details from different compounds and enclosures is facilitated. So far as is practicable, an adequate distance between such work details to preclude such exchanges should be maintained.

3-67. Guard Force

a. The guard force of a PW enclosure provides for tower guards, gate guards, other special guards, and a reserve. The tower guards may be supplemented by patrols under certain conditions. Work detail guards, PW escort guards, and other guards required for special details are not normally a part of the guard force.

b. The guard force consists of a commander of the guard, one or more sergeants of the guard, a relief commander for each relief, and the necessary number of tower and gate guards.

c. Orders for PW guards are of two types: general orders and special orders. General orders apply to all guards. Special orders apply to particular posts and duties. All guards are required to know, understand, and comply with the general orders outlined for sentinels in FM 22-6. Special orders supplement general orders. They are established by the camp commander and may differ for the various guard posts.

d. The guard force reserve is composed of the reliefs not on post. It is large enough to reinforce the tower and gate guards but is not normally used to enter the enclosure compounds to quell disturbances or to conduct searches.

e. Tower guards are posted in towers which are located so as to permit the entire perimeter of the enclosure to be under the clear observation of one or more of the tower guards. The primary duties of the tower guards are to prevent escapes and to observe and report any unauthorized or suspicious PW activities. Walking patrols between guard towers are established primarily to supplement the perimeter security when weather conditions or light failures prevent clear observation of the entire perimeter by the tower guards.

f. Gate guards are posted, as required, at each perimeter gate. In accordance with their special orders and prescribed security regulations, they exercise control over all personnel, equipment, or vehicular movements through the gate. Generally their duties will include responsibility for the passage of authorized personnel only; the
maintenance of a record of personnel, vehicles, work details, etc.; and the conduct of shakedown searches in accordance with standing operating procedures. Particular care must be taken to prevent the introduction of weapons or other unauthorized items into the enclosures and the escape of PW.

3-68. Special Guard Details

a. Work guard details are provided on the minimal basis required to assure reasonable security against PW escapes. Guards must keep a reasonable distance from PW and properly position themselves so as to provide the best observation. The PW of one labor detail are not permitted to mingle or come into close contact with those from another detail. Authorized rest breaks should be taken by one guard at a time, and while the PW are working. Guards for PW work details released to a using agency are normally provided by that agency.

b. Escort guards, properly armed and equipped, are detailed to guard PW being evacuated or transferred. Adequate security measures should be taken to minimize the possibilities of disturbances and of escapes. Security precautions include:

(1) The thorough searching of all PW immediately prior to transfer.
(2) The securing of all windows when transfer is effected by rail.
(3) The proper scheduling of movements to provide, when possible, for their arrival in, or passage through, large cities at night or when few people will be present.
(4) The making of prior arrangements for additional guards, if required, for scheduled stops or upon arrival at destination if movement is by air or rail.

3-69. Patrol Dog Employment

The patrol dog offers both a psychological and a real deterrent against PW attempts to escape and also reinforces security measures against penetrations or attacks by hostile elements that may be in the area. An additional and important consideration is that the patrol dog offers a positive and effective alternative to the use of firearms in the prevention of PW escapes. Employment techniques designed to capitalize upon the capabilities of the patrol dog potentials are discussed below.

a. Demonstrations. To increase the psychological deterrent of the patrol dog, periodic demonstrations should be held in full view of the PW. Such demonstrations should particularly emphasize the ease and speed with which the dog can overtake a fleeing individual and his ability to attack and overcome any physical resistance. Also, the demonstrations should be designed to show the tracking capabilities of the dog. In the conduct of such demonstrations, only the best qualified patrol dog teams should be used to assure that each such demonstration is a complete and impressive success.

b. Perimeter Security. Gate and tower guards constitute the regular PW camp perimeter security forces. The patrol dog team should be used as an adjunct to this security force by making periodic but unscheduled patrols around the perimeter fence during the periods of darkness. During periods of inclement weather, temporary blackout, or electricity failure, the number and frequency of such patrols should be increased. To assure that the PW are aware of their presence, it should be made an habitual practice to have the dogs bark at infrequent intervals during the night.

c. Work Details. Large numbers of PW are normally employed on work details outside the confines of the perimeter fence of the PW enclosures. Circumstances will vary, but opportunities for individual PW to escape while on such work details are inevitable. For the security of the larger work details and particularly for those employed in areas offering the greatest escape risk, the patrol dog provides a particularly valuable adjunct to the regular work detail guard force. When so employed, the patrol dog team should be positioned between the PW work detail and the area which offers the greatest opportunity for escape.

d. Escape. When PW escape attempts are successful, the tracking capabilities of the patrol dog may be called upon in effecting recapture. Tracking techniques and procedures are contained in FM 20–20.

3-70. Escape

a. The number of PW escapes may be kept to a minimum by the observance of proper security precautions. Among such precautions are:

(1) The conduct of periodic, unannounced and systematic searches of compound and enclosure areas and facilities to detect any evidence of tunneling and to discover caches of food, clothing, weapons, maps, and money or other valuables that might be of assistance to a PW in effecting an escape and avoiding apprehension.
(2) The maintenance of strict accountability for tools and equipment used by PW or to which
they may have access. Tools and equipment brought into a compound or enclosure for use should be checked in and out by item and number.

(3) The daily examination of all perimeter fences to detect any evidence of wire cutting or other weaknesses in the fence.

(4) The careful examination of the lighting system during hours of darkness to detect poorly lighted areas along the perimeter. Burned out or broken light bulbs should be reported and replaced without delay.

(5) The conduct of training, to include refresher training, to insure that all security and guard personnel are thoroughly familiar with all security precautions, techniques, and procedures.

(6) All vehicles and containers taken into or out of a compound or enclosure should be carefully searched.

(7) The disposition of unconsumed rations, both in the camp and on work details, should be closely supervised to prevent the establishment of food "caches."

b. The following measures will assist in the early detection of PW escapes:

(1) The conduct of roll calls and PW counts on both a scheduled and an unannounced basis will enable the early detection of an escape and the identification of the escapee(s).

(2) Roll calls should be conducted twice daily, preferably as early as practicable in the morning and again before "lights out" at night. Standard operating procedures should be published governing PW movements and formations during these periods and prescribing roll call procedures and reporting.

(3) Other PW counts may be conducted independently of roll calls. Additional appropriate times for PW counts may be immediately follow-

Section XIII. RIOT CONTROL OPERATIONS

3-71. Types of Disturbances

a. Riots. Riots may be either—

(1) Organized. The PW, being members of a military organization, may readily reorganize themselves into quasimilitary groups. These groups are capable of developing plans and tactics for riots and disorders. Riots may be instigated for the purposes listed below:

(a) For purpose of escape. A riot may be organized either as a diversion for an escape attempt by selected individuals or small groups, or for a mass escape attempt.

(b) For political purposes. Riots may be organized as a means of embarrassing the detaining powers in their relations with the protecting powers and other nations, or for use as propaganda by the nations of personnel engaged in the riot. They may also be organized as a means of intimidating other individuals or groups which may have been cooperative with the detaining power.

(c) As a grievance protest. Grievance protests, both real and fancied, may be organized as riots. Under normal circumstances, a riot of this
type will not be of an extremely violent nature initially but may become so as the leaders attempt to exploit any successes of the riot or weaknesses of the detaining powers.

(d) For tactical purposes. Riots may be organized solely for the purpose of causing the detaining power to maintain large numbers of troops, thereby limiting, to a certain extent, personnel available as combat troops.

(2) Unorganized. Unorganized riots are characterized at their inception as being spontaneous in nature, although they may be exploited and diverted by leaders at any subsequent stage into a different type. They may begin initially as a holiday celebration, a group singing, a religious gathering, a fire, or any other type of gathering which might lead to group hysteria. Under determined leadership, the pattern of these gatherings may be changed to that of an organized riot.

b. Disorders. Like riots, disorders may be either organized or unorganized. They do not possess the violent nature of riots but, if not controlled promptly, may develop into riots either through leadership and organization or by natural development through group hysteria.

(1) Organized.

(a) Demonstrations. Demonstrations are the actions of groups of persons whose behavior, while not violent, is in conflict with those in authority. They are characterized by unruliness and vocal expressiveness without violence. Demonstrations may be organized in celebration of national holidays; as protests against food, clothing, living conditions, and treatment; or other similar factors.

(b) Refusal to work or eat. The PW and civilian internees may refuse to work or eat either collectively or individually as a means of harassing the detaining power or in an attempt to gain concessions from the detaining powers. Prompt isolation and segregation of such offenders and their ringleaders normally will control this type of disorder.

(c) Work slowdown. Deliberate slowdown of work to delay the completion of work projects, thereby harassing the detaining power, may be initiated by PW and civilian internees. Disorders of this type can be controlled in the same manner as refusals to work or eat.

(d) Damage or destruction of property. Damage or destruction of property by PW and civilian internees can be initiated for harassment of the detaining powers, to impede or prevent normal operations of the facility, or for tactical purposes. Identification, isolation, and segregation of personnel involved normally will control this type of disorder.

(2) Unorganized. Unorganized disorders, like riots, are characterized as being spontaneous in nature. They may begin as a result of the actions of an individual or for the reasons listed for unorganized riots. Like organized riots, their prompt control is essential.

3-72. PW Camp Riot Control Operations

a. General. Riot control operations in PW camps are characterized by the prior employment of riot control agents and timely followup actions by supporting troops. The particular objective of PW riot control operations is to restore order while avoiding the necessity for resorting to physical violence, particularly the use of firepower. The effective incapacitation of the rioting PW in a compound or compounds prior to troop entry will permit realization of the objective of nonviolent restoration of order. It is only through a nonviolent means of restoring order that a true capability for exercising effective PW control can be said to exist. PSYOP resources can play an effective role in achieving nonviolent restoration of order. The restoration of order through means which result in death or injuries to PW is, at least in part, self-defeating since, whatever the circumstances, the death or injury of “defenseless” PW is frequently an enemy propaganda objective. Only when the employment of riot control agents is rendered inapplicable because of extreme weather conditions should the use of physical force alone for the restoration of order be considered. Even under these circumstances, the necessity for immediate control actions, as opposed to the delay of such actions pending more favorable weather conditions, should be carefully evaluated. The techniques, operational procedures, and troop deployments described below are keyed to the standard type PW camps, enclosures, and compounds. To the extent that physical layouts of a camp may differ therefrom, the guidance set forth herein may have to be modified to accommodate terrain and structural differences.

b. Riot Control Agent. Riot control agent CS, in both the micropulverized and burning forms, is authorized for use in the control of prisoner of war riots. CS is effective in very small quantities. The effects of CS on the eyes and respiratory system are realized in seconds and last from 5 to 10 minutes after removal of the affected individuals to fresh air. Generally, individuals exposed to CS are incapable of executing organized or concerted
actions and the effects are sufficiently distressing that few individuals are willing to undergo a second exposure.

c. Riot Control Agent Dispersers and Grenades. The riot control agent disperser, portable, M33, weighing approximately 30 pounds including 8 pounds of CS and riot control agent disperser, helicopter or vehicle-mounted, M5, weighing approximately 210 pounds, including 50 pounds of CS, permit the very rapid establishment of effective quantities of the irritant agent over extensive areas. Supplementing these dispersers are the bursting (M25 series) and burning (M7 series) type riot control grenades.

d. Supply. Basic loads of riot control agents should be reviewed for adequacy in camps in which uncooperative PW are interned. Provisions should be made for the expeditious delivery of replacement or supplemental issues from a strategic storage point(s) in the theater.

e. Training and Plans. Courses of instruction in riot control operations, appropriate for administrative and security personnel, should be developed and vigorously implemented in each PW camp. Riot control plans are developed in detail and maximum proficiency, individual and group, is assured by the conduct of regular and intensive training.

3-73. The Riot Control Force

For a type force organization, see figure 3–4. While the size and organization of a riot control force may differ from that depicted, each such force must provide, as a minimum, a fully trained and immediately responsive riot control agent dissemination element, together with adequate supporting troops, to accomplish the required followup actions of removing PW from the compounds, conducting a thorough search of the affected compound and of the individual PW, and of identifying the ring leaders or instigators.

3-74. Deployment at Scene of Riot

Following arrival at the PW enclosure, troop deployment, as shown in figure 3–5 will permit the rapid and effective dissemination of the irritant agent over the compound area and will provide for the proper positioning of supporting troops for the discharge of their respective responsibilities in accordance with the operational procedures and techniques further described herein.

3-75. Riot Control Agent Dissemination Techniques

a. Following positioning of all elements of the riot control force as depicted in figure 3–5, and upon command, vehicle number 1 carrying the M5 disperser and operator proceeds from the position at which stationed to the far end of compound perimeter fence. The speed of the vehicle and the release rate of the agent will be contingent upon the wind speed. Proficiency in this regard must be developed through prior training utilizing the training agent, technical talc, TF. Further, the adequacy of the agent coverage being established may be observed directly and the agent coverage and concentration increased or decreased accordingly either by reducing or increasing the vehicle speed, or the release rate, or both. The effects of adequate concentrations of the agent on exposed personnel are essentially instantaneous and should result in the immediate and apparent distress of each such individual. The symptoms are extreme watering of the eyes, a choking sensation, and chest pains. Although the effects of the agent will disappear in 5 to 10 minutes in clear air, the experience is one which few PW will care to repeat, thereby providing considerable assurance of their subsequent good behavior.

b. Immediately following the moving out of vehicle number 1, vehicle number 2 proceeds to and occupies the position originally held by vehicle number 1. If required, and upon command only, vehicle number 2 provides additional agent coverage in the same manner as vehicle number 1. In the meantime, vehicle number 1, having completed its run, proceeds directly and expeditiously to the riot control agent refill location, after which it returns to its original position in readiness for further agent dissemination should such be required.

c. Following entry of troops into the compound, the two portable disperser operators provide additional agent coverage on an “as required” basis. Those PW who escape effective exposure in the initial agent release either through vagaries of the wind currents or protection afforded by the buildings are particular targets for the portable disperser operators. Upon exhausting their agent load, the portable disperser operators immediately proceed to the riot control agent refill location, and are replaced by the two portable disperser operators in reserve.

d. The foregoing procedure provides for a capability to establish and maintain effective agent concentrations even under relatively high wind conditions. Under optimum circumstances, a maximum of 15 to 20 pounds or less of agent CS1 should provide for a fully effective agent concentration over the entire open area of the compound.
**RIOT CONTROL REACTION FORCE**

**COMMAND ELEMENT**

1 officer; 2 enlisted men
1 radio; 1 pistol, automatic, caliber .45, M1911A1;
3 helmets, steel, M1, w/liners; 3 masks, protective, field, M9A1; 1 first aid kit; ammunition, basic
load per weapon.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RIOT CONTROL AGENT SECTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 disperser operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 disperser maintenance and refill team of 2 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 pistol, automatic, cal .45, M1911A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 rifles, M16A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 masks, protective, field M9A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 helmets, steel, M1, w/liners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 1/4-ton vehicle, w/radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 irritant agent dispersers, M33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 irritant agent dispersers, M5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 irritant agent, basic load per dispenser; ammunition, basic load per weapon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1ST PLATOON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 squads of 9 men each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 unarmed men, grenade throwers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 pistol, automatic, cal .45, M1911A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 rifles, M16A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 bayonets w/scabbards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 shotguns, 12 gauge, riot type, w/bayonet attachments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 bayonets, M1917, w/scabbards, M1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 masks, protective, field, M9A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120 gas grenades (CS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 bags for carrying gas grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 cutters, wire, M1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 carriers, wire cutter, M1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 machetes, M1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 sheaths, machete, M1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 helmets, steel, M1, w/liners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 radio ammunition, basic load per weapon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2D PLATOON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 squads of 9 men each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 unarmed men, grenade throwers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 pistol, automatic, cal .45, M1911A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 rifles, M16A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 bayonets w/scabbards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 shotguns, 12 gauge, riot type, w/bayonet attachments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 cutters, wire, M1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 carriers, wire cutter, M1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 machetes, M1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 sheaths, machete, M1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 helmets, steel, M1, w/liners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 radio ammunition, basic load per weapon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3D PLATOON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 squads of 9 men each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 unarmed men, grenade throwers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 unarmed searchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 pistol, automatic, cal .45, M1911A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 rifles, M16A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 bayonets w/scabbards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 shotguns, 12 gauge, riot type, w/bayonet attachments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 bayonets, M1917, w/scabbards, M1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53 masks, protective, field, M9A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120 gas grenades (CS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 bags for carrying gas grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 cutters, wire, M1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 carriers, wire cutter, M1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 machetes, M1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 sheaths, machete, M1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53 helmets, steel, M1, w/liners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 receptacles for confiscated items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ammunition, basic load per weapon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3-4. Type PW camp riot control force.
LEGEND

WIND DIRECTION

M5
VEHICLE MOUNTED M5 DISPERSER

M33
PORTABLE M33 DISPERSER

1A
1ST PLATOON, PRE-AGENT RELEASE POSITION

1B
1ST PLATOON, POST-AGENT RELEASE POSITION

2
2D PLATOON

3
3D PLATOON

Figure 3-5. Type riot control force enclosure deployment.
3-76. Troop Operational Techniques

a. 1st Platoon. The mission of this platoon is first to remove all PW and then to thoroughly search the compound area, including each of the buildings for weapons and other contraband.

(1) Initial deployment of the 1st platoon is at or near the compound entrance, pending release of the irritant agent (fig 3-6). The exact moment of entry of this platoon into the compound will be determined by direct observation of the agent coverage of the compound area and the reactions of the PW exposed thereto. The incapacitation of the exposed PW should be clearly obvious before the troop entry. Under favorable conditions, troop entry to the compound should approximately coincide with or shortly precede completion of the first irritant agent run by vehicle number 1. Under less favorable conditions, entry may await the release of additional quantities of the agent by vehicle number 2.

(2) Following entry into the compound and with the entrance gate left open, the platoon proceeds directly to the far end of the compound where it forms as a double line of skirmishers across the width of the compound. Troops carrying M7 hand grenades are dispersed throughout the rear skirmish line in immediate readiness to engage any PW giving the slightest indication of further resistance. When required, such grenades should be employed in sufficient time to avoid the necessity for the exercise of physical force by the troop elements.

(3) As the skirmish line approaches the first building, the entire line halts in place while the M25 bursting type grenades are thrown into the building through a window or forced opening. When all PW have been forced from the building where it forms as a double line of skirmishers across the width of the compound. Troops carrying M7 hand grenades are dispersed throughout the rear skirmish line in immediate readiness to engage any PW giving the slightest indication of further resistance. When required, such grenades should be employed in sufficient time to avoid the necessity for the exercise of physical force by the troop elements.

(4) Following the PW removal, the platoon engages in a thorough search of the entire compound area and of each building for any contraband, items of intelligence value, and weapons. Upon completion of the compound search, the 1st platoon re-forms and marches to the service area where it is held as a reserve force.

b. 2d Platoon. The mission of the 2d platoon, positioned along the center runway as depicted in figure 3-5, is to channel and control the movements of the PW from the compound being evacuated to the service area. Upon completion of the compound evacuation, the 2d platoon reforms and marches to the recreation area where it is held as a reserve force pending completion of individual PW searches and their return to the compound or other disposition.

c. 3d Platoon. The mission of the 3d platoon is to receive, hold, and search each of the PW as they arrive from the compound being evacuated (fig 3-5). The searchers should take their positions in front of the skirmish lines and approximately 20 feet apart. The PW are formed in single lines in front of the searchers as they arrive and are ordered to assume a sitting position until the searchers are ready to search them. The PW at the head of each line moves to the searcher to be searched. As searches are completed, the PW proceed to a designated location in the administrative area and are again required to assume the sitting position. This process is continued until all PW have been searched. After the search of all PW has been completed, they are returned in groups of 25 to their compound. Those PW requiring medical attention, if any, are escorted to the enclosure dispensary for treatment.

d. All Platoons. Following completion of the individual PW searches and prior to their return to their compound, the squad leaders of each platoon are directed to check all men in their squads to make sure that all weapons, grenades and protective equipment are accounted for. If a weapon, grenade, or protective mask is missing and there is reason to believe that it was lost in the enclosure, a thorough search of all areas used by the riot control force is made until the missing item or items are found.

3-77. Riots in More Than One Compound

When PW in one compound start rioting, those in other compounds in the enclosure may also riot. To meet this situation with only one riot control force available, the force commander should first subdue the PW in the most riotous compound. At the same time, he should employ some of his riot control agent teams to contain the other compounds in which rioting is taking place until the riot control force is free to subdue them. Should another alert force be available, the procedure described in 3-75 apply, except that rioters should be channeled to an area other than the recreation area.

3-78. Record of Events

At the beginning of a riot or serious incident, a record of events should be initiated to provide a basis for the preparation and submission of a
formal report, to higher headquarters. As a minimum, the following should be included:

a. The time the incident was reported and by whom.

b. The time the enclosure commander reported it to his immediate commander.

c. The time the riot control force was alerted.

d. The time the riot control force commander reported to the affected enclosure.

e. The time the riot control force entered the enclosure.

f. The weather conditions as they related to the

Figure 3-6. Type riot control platoon compound employment.
use of riot control munitions, the types and amounts used, and the results or effects of the agents.

a. The number of US personnel injured or killed, including how they were injured or killed and the medical attention given them.

i. The time the operation was completed and the riot control force cleared the enclosure.

Section XIV. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

3-79. Personnel
The necessary control over PW is best achieved with carefully selected and trained personnel. The specialized nature of duty at internment facilities requires individuals who can be depended upon to cope successfully with behavior or incidents which call for calm, judicious but immediate decisive action. These personnel must possess the highest qualities of leadership and judgment. They are required to observe rigid self-discipline and to maintain a soldierly, impersonal attitude.

3-80. Training
Personnel assigned or attached to internment facilities should be oriented and specially trained in the custody and control of PW. Each individual should be fully cognizant of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions as they apply to PW/CI treatment. A formal continuing training program should be established to include, as a minimum, the following subjects:

- b. Supervisory and human relations techniques.
- c. Self-defense methods.
- d. Application of force.
- e. Firearms familiarization and qualification.
- f. Public relations (particularly in CONUS operations).
- g. First aid.
- h. Emergency plans.
- i. Camp regulations.
- j. Intelligence and counterintelligence techniques.
- k. Cultural customs and habits of the PW.
- l. Simple training in the language of the PW.
- m. Use of riot control agents and dispersers.